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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
SELF-INCRIMINATION-WITNESS-LOSS OF EMPLOY-
MENT BY ASSERTING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: A PROFESSOR'S DILEMMA
During recent months many college professors have been sub-
poenaed before congressional investigating committees.' The
questions and answers at some of these investigations were similar
to the following:
Q: Are there any instructors on the faculty who are mem-
bers of the Communist Party?
A: I refuse to testify on the grounds that I may tend to
incriminate myself.
Q: Have you attended any Communist meetings?
A: I refuse to testify on the same grounds.
Q: Are you a member of the Communist Party?
A: I refuse to testify on the same grounds.
After considerable dissent from organized professor groups, 2
at least thirty3 of these professors were discharged.4  With the
exception of cases in New York City, where the city charter speci-
fically provides that the exercise of the privilege automatically
1 The investigation of Communist infiltration into colleges is not of
recent origin. See Countryman, Un-American Activities in the State of
Washington (1951).
2In 39 American Association of University Professors Bulletin 95-96
(1953), the professors took the position that assertion of the privilege
was not sufficient grounds for dismissing a professor. See a similar posi-
tion taken by the faculty of Columbia University, School and Society,
July 11, 1946, p. 11.
3A survey completed in July, 1953 showed that of seventy-one pro-
fessors and teachers who declined to answer questions before the House
Un-American Activities Committee in the previous ten months, thirty had
been dismissed; dismissal action had been started against two; eight had
resigned; nine had been suspended; twelve cases were pending; and only
ten had been retained. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1953, p. 13, col. 1.
4 Professors were discharged from the following universities: Uni-
versity of Vermont, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1953, p. 27, col. 3; Rutgers
University, Ohio State University, and New York University, Committee
Report, Association of American Law Schools Bulletin 91-93 (1953).
Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology have re-
tained professors who asserted the privilege. They admit that detailed
inquiry should be made to determine the reason of the professor in as-
serting the privilege, Ibid.
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terminates employment,5 only one of these cases has reached the
appellate courts.6
In Faxon v. School Committee of Boston an instructor, while
before an investigating committee, asserted the privilege against
self-incrimination when asked questions concerning his affilia-
tion with the Communist Party. Because of his assertion of the
privilege, the school district discharged him. The court affirmed
the action of the school district.
No doubt this case will stimulate substantial adverse com-
ment since many writers have argued that an instructor should
not be discharged for asserting the privilege.7  It is the purpose
of this note to explore the other side of the argument and to
present arguments which justify the discharge of a professor who
asserts the privilege against self-incrimination.
5 Shlakman v. Board of Higher Education, 282 App. Div. 718, 122
N.Y.S.2d 286 (2d Dep't 1953); Koral v. Board of Higher Education, 197
Misc. 221, 94 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup. ct. 1950). In Goldway v. Board of
Higher Education, 178 Misc. 1023, 37 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. ct. 1942), the
court made the distinction that loss of employment through exercising
the privilege against self-incrimination did not abrogate the privilege since
the employee had a constitutional right to refuse to answer incriminating
questions, but did not have a constitutional right to a job. Art. 1, Sec. 6
of the New York Constitution provides that a public employee must waive
his privilege or forfeit his job. See this provision upheld in Canteline v.
McCellan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940).
6 The federal government has been faced with a similar problem. Presi-
dent Eisenhower in Exec. Order No. 10491, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583 (1953),
amending Exec. Order No. 10450, 19 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953) ordered that
an inquiry should be made as to whether a government employee had as-
serted the privilege against self-incrimination before a congressional com-
mittee in determining his eligibility to keep a government job. See fur-
ther comment on this order by Attorney General Brownell in N.Y. Times,
Oct. 15, 1953, p. 23, col. 3.
There are very few analgous cases. See Christal v. Police Commis-
sion of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (held that a
policeman had a duty to relate all facts, and the assertion of the privilege
was contrary to his duty). Contra: In Re Consolidated Western Steel Corp.,
13 Labor Arbitration Reports 721 (1949) (employee could not be dis-
charged for asserting the privilege).
7 Byse, Teachers and the Fifth Amendment, 102 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 871
(1954); Note, 37 Detroit L. Rev. 30 (1954); 39 American Association of
University Professors Bulletin 95-96 (1953). See letter from Andrews,
Dean of Syracuse University College of Law, to N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct.
26, 1953, p. 14, cols. 3. 4, 5. For arguments against discharging govern-
ment employees who assert the privilege, see Note, 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
1190 (1953).
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I. THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE
The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and the
constitutions of forty-six statess provide that no person shall be
compelled to give'evidence against himself in any criminal case.
By judicial construction the privilege has been extended to en-
compass legislative hearings9 and many other similar investiga-
tions.1 0
II. RIGHTFUL USE OF THE PRIVILEGE
A person may only assert the privilege when in fact his
answer may tend to incriminate him.' The ultimate issue then
becomes whether a question such as, "Are you a member of the
Communist Party?" is an incrimminating question.
Although a recent act has been passed which outlaws the
Communist Party,12 these professors fall within the province of
the Smith Act.13 In a prosecution under the Smith Act the follow-
ing three component facts have to be shown: (1) the Communist
Party taught or advocated overthrow of the government by force
or violence; (2) the professor was a member of the Communist
Party; (3) the professor knew the Communist party had the ob-
jective of overthrowing the government by force and violence.
If the professor is compelled to admit his membership in the
Party, he will give the prosecution a link in a chain of evidence
needed for a conviction under the Smith Act and other similar
laws. 14 Therefore, questions as to membership in the Communist
Party have been held to be incriminating.'!
A. What Inferences May be Drawn when the Privilege is As-
serted in Response To Such Questions?
It would seem that an inference may be drawn that the pro-
fessor is a Communist; if he is not a Communist, then the question
would not be incriminating and an assertion of the privilege
s Collection of state constitutional provisions in 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2252 n. 3 (3d ed. 1940). In New Jersey and Iowa the privilege is a
part of the common law. See State v. Miller, 71 N.J.L. 527, 60 Atl. 202
(1905); State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902).
9 United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1912 (D. D.C. 1951).
10oMcCarthy v. Ardnstein, 262 U.S. 355 (1923) (bankruptcy proceed-
ings); Counselman v. Hitchcock. 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (grand jury); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (statutory proceeding for forfeiture
of goods); Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950) (inspections
before immigation officials).
"Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950).
12 Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1954).
13 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
14 Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 18 U.S.C. § 156 (1952).
'G Healey v. United States, 186 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950).
NOTES
would be unlawful. In a disbarment proceeding the refusal of
the defendant to take the witness stand and deny the allegations
created a presumption of the defendant's guilt.1 A similar re-
sult is reached in civil proceedings.' 7  Wigmore argues that an
inference of the truth of the answer sought is a proper inference
to draw when a witness invokes the privilege.'8 He argues:
'Logic id logic,' ever since the days of the one-hoss shay; and it
is on that score impossible to deny that the very claim of the
privilege involves a confession of the fact. 'Were you assisting
the defendant at the time of the affray'?; this may be answered
'yes' or 'no'; if 'no' the fact is not incriminating and the privilege
is not applicable; if 'yes', the fact is incriminating and the privi-
lege applies. The inference, as a mere matter of logic, is not
only possible but inherent and cannot be denied.
Some will argue that an inference of guilt is not the only
inference which may be drawn from a rightful assertion of the
privilege. They will argue that the following alternative infer-
ences may be drawn:
(1) Fear of Prosecution
There is dicta in a Supreme Court decision 9 that an inference
of the truth of the answer sought is not the only inference that
may be drawn, arguing that the witness, although innocent, may
have asserted the privilege solely because of his fear of prosecu-
tion and a wrongful conviction. Recently, the court of appeals
in Healey v. United States20 amplified the "fear of prosecution"
argument with a hypothetical case similar to the following:
X has made threats against the life of Y. When X is walking
along a road, he sees Y's body with a knife sticking in it. He pulls
the knife from Y's body and is seen clutching it.
Assume that before the grand jury X is asked the question,
"Did you make threats against the life of Y?" If X answers the
question truthfully by replying, "Yes," he will strengthen the
prosecution's case by providing them with strong evidence that
he killed Y. Instead, X invokes the privilege on the theory that a
16In re Randel, 158 N.Y. 216, 52 N.E. 1106 (1899).
17 Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash.2d 123, 261 P.2d 684 (1953); Stillman
Pond, Inc. v. Watson, 115 Cal. App.2d 440, 252 P.2d 717 (1953); Fross
v. Wotton, 3 Cal.2d 384, 44 P.2d 350 (1935); Ridge v. State ex rel. Tate,
206 Ala. 349, 89 So. 742 (1921); Morris v. McCelland, 154 Ala. 639, 45
So. 641 (1908); Andres v. Frye, 194 Mass. 234 (1870). Contra: Master-
son v. Transit Co., 204 Mo. 507, 103 S.W. 48 (1907).
s 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2272 (3d ed. 1940).
19 Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
20 186 F.2d 164, 167, 168 (9th Cir. 1950).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
truthful answer will compel him to be a witness against himself.
It seems clear that an innocent witness could invoke the privilege
in response to such questions solely from a fear of prosecution.
However, the court of appeals ignored the second question
which logically arises from their hypothetical fact situation. As-
sume X is asked the question, "Did you kill Y?" X raises the
privilege and refuses to testify. The court of appeals would argue
that an inference that X killed Y couldn't be drawn because X
raised the privilege solely because of his fear of prosecution. But
the fallacy in the court's argument is the fact that X could not
have possibly feared prosecution. All X had to do was truthfully
answer, "No." How could he strengthen the prosecution's case by
simply telling the truth?
Similarly, a college professor is asked, "Have you attended
any Communist meetings?" He has attended Communist meet-
ings but is not a Communist. He would rightfully invoke the
privilege on the theory of a fear of prosecution since an affirma-
tive answer would strengthen the prosecution's case in a subse-
quent action for violation of the Smith Act. Next the professor
is asked the question, "Are you a member of the Communist
Party?". Since he is not a Communist, a truthful answer in the
negative would not in any way harm him and would not cause
him to fear prosecution. As a result he would not have any rea-
son for asserting the privilege.
It would seem that the "fear of prosecution" argument is
only applicable when the innocent witness is asked to relate cir-
cumstantial evidence but inapplicable when he is asked the "sixty-
four dollar" question.
But there is a fear that a clever examiner will follow this
line of questioning: (1) "Are you a member of the Communist
Party?" (2) "Have you attended any Communist Meetings?" 2'
It is argued that a professor who has attended Communist meet-
ings but who is not a Communist will never be able to raise the
privilege in response to the second question unless he first raises
the privilege in response to the first question.22 This argument
is based on the doctrine of the waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination. This rule prohibits a witness who voluntarily
discloses facts from raising the privilege when he later is asked
details concerning his voluntary disclosure.2 3 If the professor is
compelled to give a truthful answer of "No" when he is first asked
21 Byse, Teachers and the Fifth Amendment, 102 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
871 (1954).
22 Ibid.
23 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950).
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whether he is a Communist, he will have made a voluntary dis-
closure and will waive the privilege as to all future questions con-
cerning the details of that disclosure. Consequently, he will not
be able to assert the privilege in response to the second question,
"Have you attended Communist meetings?" since it is merely a
detail concerning his voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the argu-
ment goes, the professor should be able to raise the privilege in
response to the first question, even though he is not a Communist,
so he can save the privilege for the second question.
However, the argument has an obvious fallacy. The waiver
rule provides that where the witness makes an "'admission of
guilt or incriminating fact'," the privilege cannot be later invoked
to avoid disclosure of the details.24  If the professor truthfully
answers "No" when he is asked, "Are you a member of the Com-
munist Party?," he would not be admitting an incriminating fact,
but, on the contrary, he would be denying an incriminating fact.
Therefore, the waiver argument would be inapplicable.
But it is argued that a professor who is not a Communist
but has attended Communist meetings may have asserted the
privilege in response to both questions because of his fear of the
"voluntary transaction rule."'25 Foster v. People20 is an excellent
example of the rule. In a bastardy proceeding a witness was
called in behalf of the defendant and asked whether the plaintiff
had sexual intercourse with other men during the month in which
the child was begotten. He said she had intercourse with men
other than the defendant. On cross-examination the witness was
asked to name the men with whom the plaintiff had sexual inter-
course. The witness refused to testify, asserting the privilege
against self-incrimination. The court held that the witness had
waived the privilege since he had opened the "transaction" and
therefore had to answer all questions related to the "transaction."
It is argued that if the professor truthfully answers that he is
not a Communist, he opens the "transaction" and therefore must
admit that he has attended Communist meetings.27
The rule seems inapplicable to congressional investigations.
The policy behind the rule is that a witness who voluntarily dam-
24 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1950), citing McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 359 (1923). See also Arndstein v. McCarthy,
254 U.S. 71 (1920); United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.
1942); Buckeye Powder Co. v. Hazard Powder Co, 205 F. Supp. 827 (D.
Conn. 1913).
25 Supra note 21, at 876, 877.
26 65 Mass. (11 Cushing) 473 (1853); see also State v. Nichols, 29
Minn. 357 (1882).
27 Supra note 21, at 877.
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ages a party litigant should be compelled to tell all the details so
the party litigant can contradict or disprove the testimony of the
witness. Such a policy does not exist in congressional investiga-
tions. Whom does the witness harm by first denying that he is
a Communist and then later refusing to state whether or not he
has attended Communist meetings? Secondly, although the rule
has applied frequently in jury trials in state courts,28 it has never
been applied by the federal courts in congressional investiga-
tions.-
(2) Fear of Prosecution for Perjury
To destroy the inference of guilt drawn from the lawful use
of the privilege, an argument, which has never been passed on by
the courts, has been made that an innocent witness would assert
the privilege solely for a fear of prosecution for perjury.30  Such
an argument may be exlained by the following fact situation:
X, a professor of comparative government, has made statements
in the classroom to the effect that Communism has many outstand-
ing economic advantages over Capitalism, and it is the United
States and not Russia who is guilty of war mongering. In fact,
X abhors Communism but has merely talked the "Communist
Line" to motivate class discussion. Later X is brought before
an investigating committee and asked whether he is a member
of the Communist Party.
X could truthfully answer "No" to this question. However,
his statements in the classroom would seem to indicate that he
is a Communist. Therefore, a truthful negative answer would
seem to indicate a contradiction between his past attitude in the
2 s 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2276 (3d ed. 1940).
29 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to apply the "transaction"
doctrine in McCarthy v. Ardnstein, 262 U.S. 355 (1923). Arndstein, an
involuntary bankrupt, appeared before a special bankruptcy commission.
He voluntarily filed a schedule of his assets and liabilities, showing only
one item of property, namely, a bank deposit of $18,000. When questioned
about his other assets, he raised the privilege against self-incrimination.
The prosecution argued that he had waived the privilege because of his
voluntary disclosure of $18,000 assets. The court discussed Foster v.
Pierce, 65 Mass (11 Cushing) 473 (1853), and came to the conclusion that
the privilege was waived only when the witness admitted incriminating
facts. It would seem that the Arndstein case is contrary to the Foster
case. The Foster case argues that the questions do not have to be in-
criminating before the witness waives the privilege-all that is re-
quired is for the witness to voluntarily open the transaction. The Arndstein
case states that the question which the witness voluntarily answers must
be an incriminating question.
30 Dean Andrews of Syracuse University College of Law suggests this
argument in a letter to the N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 26, 1953, p. 14, cols.
3, 4, 5.
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classroom and his present answer before the committee. Seeing
this contradiction, the government would subsequently bring a
criminal prosecution for perjury against him. By giving a truth-
ful answer the professor would be giving evidence against him-
self, and the use of the privilege would be proper. If this argu-
ment were adopted by the courts, it would contain these weak-
nesses:
(1) The subpoena power of Congress would be substantially
weakened. Many of the witnesses who are subpoenaed to appear
before congressional committees have had some "shady conduct"
in their past, otherwise they would not be summoned as witnesses.
Instead of cooperating with Congress by relating names of Com-
munists they know or explaining their, own apparent connections
with the Party, they could refuse to testify on the grounds that
they feared a subsequent prosecution for perjury. The only wit-
nesses who would inform Congress of the Communist menace
would be those who knew little about the Party since only these
persons would lack a fear of prosecution for perjury.
(2) Another difficulty with this argument is its assump-
tion that courts and juries as a matter of habit find innocent men
guilty. No doubt there have been a few extreme cases where a
jury has found an innocent man guilty.31 However, under our
present judicial system, this risk is inherent in all criminal prose-
cutions. There is no special reason to'guard against such a risk
in perjury prosecutions.
B. In What Type Of Proceedings May An Inference Be Drawn
Without Destroying The Privilege?
(1) Inference in criminal proceedings
It seems clear that the federal government 32 could not use
the professor's assertion of the privilege as evidence of his mem-
bership in the Communist Party in a subsequent prosecution under
the Smith Act.33 Using the inference in a criminal prosecution
would be in derogation of the privilege3l and would relegate it to
31 Gardner, Court of Last Resort (1952).
32 Since the Supreme Court has held that the privilege does not run to
the states infra notes 42 and 43, it would seem that a state could draw
an inference from the assertion of the privilege on the federal level and
use this inference in a criminal proseuction for violation of a state law
relating to subversion.
33sWilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1883).
34 Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). See state cases col-
lected in Berg v. Pentilla, 173 Minn. 512, 217 N.W. 935 (1928).
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the status of the historic "oath ex officio." 3  A similar policy is
behind the rule in the majority of jurisdictions 36 which prohibit
the prosecution or court 37 from commenting on the defendant'i
failure to take the witness stand.38
(2) Inference in civil proceedings
The right of a university to draw inferences from the pro-
fessor's assertion of the privilege will be litigated only when the
professor brings a civil suit against the university for damages
after he has been discharged.3 9 Since the privilege only protects
the witness from giving evidence against himself in a criminal
proceeding, both state" and federal courts4' hold that an adverse
inference in a civil proceeding will not frustrate the purpose of
the privilege.
A state or private university has the power to draw an ad-
verse inference when a professor asserts the privilege. The
Supreme Court has held that the self-incrimination clause in the
Fifth Amendment is not binding on the states either through the
35 In the middle ages the ecclesiastical courts required the accused to
take an "oath ex officio." The effect of this oath was to require him to
answer truthfully all questions asked by the court. The refusal to take
the oath or to answer questions while under it was a confession of guilt.
Thus when asked whether he Nvas guilty of the alleged crime, the accused
was confronted with a dilemma: when under oath he was required to
give a truthful answer to the question, and when he refused to take the
oath, he confessed guilt. See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1930).
30 At least five states permit comment on the defendant's failure to
take the witness stand: California, Georgia, Iowa, Nevada and New
Jersey. See the constitutionality of the California and New Jersey statutes
upheld in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) and Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
37 Constitutional or statutory provisions generally prohibit the court from
commenting on the evidence. Note, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 461 (1952).
38 There has oeen much criticism of this rule. The Model Code of
Evidence, Rule 201(3) (1942) permits comment. See Dunmore, Comment
on the Failure of the Accused to Testify, 26 Yale L.J. 464 (1917).
39 See discussion of drawing inferences in civil suits in C.U.A.L. Rev.
51, 54 (1954).
40Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash.2d 123, 261 P.2d 684 (1953); Stillman
Pond, Inc. v. Vatson, 115 Cal. App.2d 440, 252 P.2d 717 (1953); Fross
v. Wotton, 3 Cal.2d 394, 44 P.2 350 (1935); Ridge v. State ex rel. Tate,
206 Ala. 340, 89 So. 742 (1921); Morris v. McCelland, 154 Ala. 639, 45
So. 641 (1908); Andrews v. Frye, 104 Mass. 234 (1870). Contra: Mas-
terson v. Transit Co., 204 Mo. 507, 103 S.W. 48 (1907).
41 United States ex rel. Zapp v. District Director of Immigration, 102
F.2d 762, 764 (2d Cir. 1941).
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theory of the "privileges and immunity" clause4 2 or the "due
process" clause43 of the Fourteenth Amendment. If a state is not
bound by the self-incrimination clause, it seems quite clear that
a private university also would not be bound.
4 4
III. MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AS SUFFICIENT
GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE
Thus far it has been established that if a professor rightfully
relies on the privilege, in that his answer will incriminate him,
then a state or private university may draw the inference that
he is a member of the Communist Party. The remaining question
is whether a University may discharge a Communist professor.
Many professors have tenure contracts45 or are protected by
state statutes4 6 which provide that they may be discharged for
"cause"4 7 or conduct of a similar nature.48  There has been dis-
agreement among professors4 9 and universities5 whether mem-
bership in the Communist Party is sufficient "cause" for dis-
charging a professor. It has been argued that mere membership
in the Party without actual indoctrination in the classroom is not
42Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
43 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
44Note, 4 Utah L. Rev. 141, 142 (1954) which reaches substantially the
same conclusion.
45,"Tenure" is the bundle of rights a professor obtains after he remains
on the faculty for a prescribed probationary period. A professor who does
not have "tenure," one who is dischargeable at will, could clearly be dis-
charged for using the privilege. See Faxon v. School Committee of Bos-
ton, 120 N.E.2d 772, 773 (Mass. 1954) where the professor could be dis-
charged at the "discretion" of the school district. See the 1940 state-
ment of the American Association of University Professors in Emerson
and Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 818 (1952).
46 Normally, college professors in state colleges do not fall under state
tenure laws. Some states have passed legislation for college professors
comparable to the legislation for secondary school teachers. In absence
of such legislation, the Board of Regents pass regulations giving tenure.
See NEA, Committee on Tenure; Its Status Critically Appraised 1 (1942);
Note, 25 B.U.L. Rev. 292 (1945); 21 Notre Dame L. Rev. 25 (1945); 8
U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 144 (1942).
47 See list of such phrases as used in tenure contracts in Emerson and
Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 880 (1952).
45 See other types of conduct which have been determined to constitute
"gross misconduct" for teachers in Emerson and Haber, Id. at 882-886.
49 The American Association of University Professors, Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists 1 (June, 1953), argue that under some circumstances a Com-
munist professor could teach.
50 The Association of American Universities has argued that a professor
who believes in Communism cannot fairly present issues in the classroom
and should be discharged. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1953, p. 12, col. 5.
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sufficient grounds for dismissing a professor.5' However, the
courts have disagreed with this contention, arguing that mere
membership in the Party is sufficient grounds for discharging
an instructor. 52 Also, if a professor remained in the Party after
the date the new Communist law5 3 went into effect, there seems
to be little doubt that the university has the right to discharge
him for "cause."
IV. WRONGFUL ASSERTIONS OF THE PRIVILEGE
A professor may only rightfully refuse to testify when his
answer will tend to incriminate him.54 If he utilizes the privilege
for any other reason, he is deemed to have unlawfully refused to
testify. 5 Therefore, some will argue that an inference that a
professor is a Communist cannot be drawn when he invokes the
privilege because all professors do not rightfully invoke the privi-
lege. On the contrary many will assert the privilege when their
answer will not incriminate them. The purpose of this section
is to point out the wrongful uses of the privilege and the con-
sequences of such wrongful uses. The following illustrate unlaw-
ful uses of the privilege:
(1) The professor may not wish to become a talebearer
and disclose fellow faculty members who belong to the Communist
Party. 6 The courts reject this reason, arguing that the privilege
against self-incrimination is solely a personal privilege and is not
available to shield the guilt of third persons. 57 But if the naming
of third persons will also incriminate the professor, then its in-
vocation is proper. 8
(2) The professor is a man of principle. He raises the
privilege to register his protest against the committee's attempt
51 The late Robert A. Taft argued vehemently that mere membership
in the Communist Party was not sufficient reason to discharge a teacher.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1953, p. 29, col. 3.
52The Appeal of Albert, 99 Pitt. Leg. J. 445 (1951); cf. Lowe's Inc.
v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 649 (9th Cir. 1951).
53 See note 12 supra.
54 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950).
55 Ibid. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1895).
56 See the testimony of Jane Rogers in Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
367 (1950).
57 See note 54 supra. A similar rule has been applied when a witness
refuses to turn over the records of a corporation. United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
Gs United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952); Alexander v.
United States, 181 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950).
NOTES
to abridge his freedom of thought.59 The privilege cannot be
utilized for such a purpose. If the committee were confronted
with many men of principle, it would be impossible for the com-
mittee to learn facts.60
(3) The professor actually abhors the doctrine of Com-
munism but will bring disrepute upon himself by admitting as-
sociation with fellow faculty members who are Communists. Early
in the history of constitutional law the privilege could be invoked
for such a reason.6 1 However, in recent years the attitude of the
courts has changed, and such a reason for refusing to testify is
treated as a misuse of the privilege. 62
(4) The professor is not presently a Communist but joined
and left the Party before the passage of the Smith Act. 3 Dis-
closures of former Communist affiliations would not be incrimi-
nating without the existence of the Smiith Act. Consequently,
the usage of the privilege under such circumstances would be un-
lawful.6 4 But it could be argued that a state had a law prohibiting
subversive activities 65 during the time he was a Communist.
Therefore, even though his answer would not be incriminating
under federal law, it would be incriminating under state law. 61
Courts, with one exception, 6 have held that fear of prosecution
59 In Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949) and Barsky
v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948) an attempt was made to
refuse to testify, not on the basis of the Fifth Amendment, but on the
First Amendment. The defendants argued that the questions concerning
their affiliations with the Communist Party infringed their freedom of
thought and speech. The court rejected this argument on the grounds
that freedom of speech must yield to the national interest.
60 For an excellent discussion see Fulbright, Congressional Investigations:
Significance for the Legislative Process, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 440 (1952).
61 United States v. Dickinson, 25 Fed. Cas. 850, No. 14,958 (D. Ohio
1840).
62 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); United States v. Orman, 207
F.2d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 1953).
63 The Smith Act was passed in 1940.
61 Brunner v. United States, 190 F.2d 167, 169 (9th Cir. 1951).
65 See New York's statute construed in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
66 Although the state statute of limitations would probably bar criminal
prosecutions, many witnesses are unaware of the statute of limitations
and still assert the privilege.
67 United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (where
the committee is investigating violations of both federal and state law,
invoking the privilege because of fear of prosecution under state law Is
proper).
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for violation of state law is not proper grounds for relying on the
privilege.6s
(5) The professor feels that by testifying he may make
some misstatement and commit perjury. If he were permitted
to refuse to answer because he feared he would lie, he would have
an unlimited right to determine whether he would or would not
testify. Therefore, this reason for relying on the privilege has
been rejected by the courts.69
(6) The professor refused to testify on the grounds that
the questions were not germane to the subject matter of the in-
vestigation 70 or on the grounds that the committee lacked con-
stitutional power to conduct such an investigation. 71 Then, after
the committee threatened to cite him for contempt for refusing
to testify, he asserted the privilege as an indirect means of at-
tacking the relevancy of the question or the committee's lack of
constitutional power. The court has also rejected this reason for
relying on the privilege. 72
A. Consequences of Unlawfully Asserting the Privilege
An unlawful use of the privilege, such as its assertion for
any of the previous reasons, is deemed by the courts73 to violate
the federal contempt statute.74
B. Is Conduct Amounting to a Violation of the Federal Con-
tempt Statute Sufficient Grounds for Discharging a Professor?
The Communists are well known for their technique of infil-
6S United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Graham v. United
States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938); Claiborne v. United States, 77 F.2d
682 (8th Cir. 1935); Perkins Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Owen, 293 Fed.
759 (D. Cal. 1923); cf. Hope v. Burns, 6 F.R.D. 556 (1947) (fear of
civil suit not sufficient grounds for refusing to testify).
69Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 (1911); Claiborne v.
United States, 77 F.2d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 1935); Edelstein v. United
States, 149 Fed. 636, 644 (1906).
70Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 262 (1929) (committee can only
ask questions pertinent to the subject matter of the investigation); see
United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
71 In McGrain v. Daugherty, 173 U.S. 135 (1927) the Supreme Court
held that Congress can investigate only subjects upon which it may con-
stitutionally legislate. However, Congress can investigate anything, whether
or not it be included in the Tenth Amendment, on the theory that it is
investigating for the purpose of a constitutional amendment.
72 Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
73 Ibid. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
74 52 Stat. 942, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1946).
NOTES
trating into sensitive areas where they are not detected while
they spread their doctrine. A university is a fertile field for
spreading their propaganda. A Communist professor by slippery
reasoning and planned inference can easily raise doubt in the
student's mind as to the true value of a Capitalistic society.7 It
is fair to assume that all universities place a clearly defined duty
on every professor to report any knowledge he has about Com-
munists on the faculty.76 A professor, who is not a Communist,
violates this duty and the contempt statute when he refuses "1o
give information to a committee on the grounds that he may
tend to incriminate himself.7 7 It would seem that this breach of
duty and a violation of the contempt statute is sufficient "cause"
for discharging him.70
However, many will argue that the university cannot de-
termine whether he has actually violated the contempt statute
until he has been tried on a contempt charge. But from the pro-
fessor's refusal to testify, the university can draw one of two
conclusions: (1) He is not a Communist. Therefore, he violated
the contempt statute and breached his duty by refusing to testify.
Violation of the contempt statute and breach of his duty to the
school should constitute sufficient "cause" for discharging him.
(2) He is a Communist and therefore rightfully relied on the
privilege. But if he is a Communist, he should also be dis-
charged. 79
Similarly, at a trial on the charge of contempt there is likely
to be one of two findings: (1) That the professor is innocent of
contempt because he is a Communist and therefore rightfully re-
lied on the privilege. (2) That the professor is guilty of con-
tempt because he is not a Communist, wrongfully relied on the
privilege and thus violated the federal contempt statute. Conse-
quently, a university should not be compelled to postpone the dis-
missal of a professor until after he has been tried for contempt
75 See excellent discussion of the problem by the President of Brooklyn
College in American Magazine, July, 1948, p. 19.
76 100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Education,
Committee on Un-American Activities (1948).
77Marshal, The Defense of Public Education From Subversion, 51 Col.
L. Rev. 587 (1951). See the statement of policy in Faxon v. School
Committee of Boston, 120 N.E.2d 772, 776 (Mass. 1954).
7sIn Lowe's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950) it was held
that the dismissal of an employee was proper even though he had merely
been cited for contempt.
79 See note 40 supra.

